Maquiladoras and Transfer Pricing in Mexico 2026: the Safe Harbor, the apa and the bapa
Technical analysis for multinational groups in the manufacturing and IMMEX sector
Executive Summary
The 2022 tax reform eliminated the option to request unilateral Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) for maquiladora operations. The last requests, filed through the end of 2021, may cover fiscal years up to 2024 under Article 34-A of the Federal Tax Code (CFF). As a result, from 2025 onward the Safe Harbor set out in Article 182 of the Income Tax Law (LISR) is, in practice, the only compliance route available to a maquiladora without a bilateral agreement.
The 2026 picture, however, does not end there. A substantial inventory of APA requests remains filed and unresolved before the SAT, some dating from 2019 or earlier. For those companies the question is not which regime to elect going forward. It is how to close an open file that, for as long as it stays open, leaves them without legal certainty and with an exposure that grows more expensive each year through inflation adjustments and surcharges.
For companies without a pending request, two structural routes remain: negotiating a Bilateral Advance Pricing Agreement (BAPA) or migrating to the general regime as a contract or toll manufacturer. Both are technically sound, but their practical availability in the short term depends on the timelines and workloads of the tax administrations involved.
For asset-intensive companies, chiefly automated plants, high-technology machinery held under bailment and consigned inventory, the Safe Harbor produces a result that artificially inflates the taxable base.
This article argues that tax efficiency in Mexico has stopped being an economic problem and become a challenge of legal and operational architecture, and that for a significant part of the sector the first step of that architecture has already been filed and simply needs to be closed.
Methodological note. This document is based on the LISR, the CFF, the IMMEX Decree, the OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2022 edition, in force for 2025-2026). The figures in the worked example are illustrative and constitute neither market comparables nor advice for a specific case.
1. The Safe Harbor: today, the regime by operation of law
Transfer pricing compliance in maquiladora operations serves to determine arm's length profits and, above all, to prevent the foreign resident from creating a Permanent Establishment (PE) in Mexico (Article 181 LISR).
The change came from the decree published in the Federal Official Gazette on 12 November 2021, effective 1 January 2022, which repealed the paragraph of Article 182 that allowed maquiladoras to meet their transfer pricing obligations through a unilateral APA. Since 2025, maquiladoras without a bilateral agreement have only the Safe Harbor available; asset-intensive operations feel the first full impact in 2025-2026.
The Safe Harbor formula: taxable profit is determined as the greater of:
6.9% of the total value of the assets used in the operation, including those of the foreign resident or related parties and those held under bailment.
6.5% of operating costs and expenses (excluding the value of raw materials the foreign party acquires on its own account).
The qualifying requirements for a maquila operation condition everything else (Article 181 LISR and the IMMEX Decree): a valid maquila agreement, foreign-owned goods subject to transformation, revenue derived from the maquila operation with up to 10% from other items under the Miscellaneous Tax Resolution, and at least 30% of machinery and equipment owned by the foreign resident. These deserve close attention because failing any one of them is not penalised with a fine: it forfeits the regime and, with it, the parent company's PE protection.
Operational obligations: filing the DIEMSE (generally in June) and maintaining inventory control under Annexes 24 and 30. These sit alongside the general transfer pricing obligations the LISR imposes on any taxpayer with related-party transactions, which the maquila regime does not displace.
The underlying problem for companies with heavy asset bases, the "asset effect": by pulling machinery held under bailment and consigned inventory into the base, the 6.9% test penalises capital-intensive companies with a base far above their functional profile as routine manufacturers.
2. The inventory of pending requests: where the problem sits today
The fact that new maquila APAs can no longer be requested does not mean the matter is closed. Quite the opposite: a significant volume of filed requests remains pending resolution before the SAT, including some from 2019 and earlier. The authority, for its part, updated the qualified income estimation mechanics (QMA) applicable to those files in both 2020 and 2024, precisely in order to clear them.
That matters because the 2024 QMA renewal was not an isolated technical adjustment. It resulted from coordinated work between the competent authorities of Mexico and the United States aimed at addressing the inventory of unilateral maquiladora APA requests held by the SAT, and it applies to Mexican fiscal years ending from 31 December 2020 through 31 December 2024.
A practical distinction follows:
Requests for fiscal years 2020 onward. These fall within the window of the QMA renewed in 2024. The methodological framework to resolve them already exists; what is missing is execution.
Requests for 2019 and earlier. These are governed by prior QMA versions (2016 and 2020). They are the oldest, carry the greatest accumulated exposure and are therefore the most urgent.
Why files stall
It is tempting to attribute the backlog solely to the authority's workload, but that reading is incomplete and, for the taxpayer, unhelpful. In public forums the SAT itself has pointed to causes on the taxpayer's and adviser's side: incorrectly completed QMA files, the expectation that the methodology will adapt to the case rather than the case being documented under the methodology, and delays in responding to information requests, which can result in a filing being treated as never submitted.
One further cause deserves separate mention because it is so common: inconsistencies between the figures in the QMA file and those the company itself reported in its annual return, in the ISSIF or in the tax audit report. The authority cross-checks these figures, and when they fail to match the result is an information request. Each request answered poorly, or answered late, adds months to the file and brings it closer to being treated as never submitted. Consistency across those four sources is, in practice, one of the few elements of the process entirely within the taxpayer's control.
The practical consequence is twofold. The file can deteriorate through inaction, and part of the backlog is genuinely within the taxpayer's control: the technical quality of the file and the speed of response depend on the company and its adviser.
What is lost while the file stays open
An APA delivers certainty, but only once resolved. While the file remains open, the maquiladora does not have that certainty. If a review arrives, an adjustment for the years involved becomes far more onerous because of the inflation adjustment, surcharges and other accessories that accumulate over time. That component grew more expensive in 2026: the late-payment surcharge rate rose from 1.47% to 2.07% per month, under Article 11 of the 2026 Federal Revenue Law in conjunction with Article 21 of the CFF. Securing resolution fixes the negotiated margin, confirms the PE exemption and closes that exposure.
Benefits of concluding a pending APA:
Certainty for the years covered, with effects on the year of the request and those that follow under its terms.
Confirmation of the parent company's PE exemption during the term of the agreement.
A negotiated margin instead of the Safe Harbor, which for an asset-intensive company can mean a substantially lower base than the 6.9% test produces.
Reduced risk of a costly adjustment, by closing the window in which accessories and surcharges accumulate.
Release of provisions for uncertain tax positions (FIN 48 / ASC 740).
An orderly transition to the optimal structure for the years not covered.
Three further considerations often weigh more heavily in the decision than the annual tax saving.
The file loses value over time, even if no one touches it. An APA covering closed fiscal years is worth the retroactive certainty it provides. As those years approach the expiry of the authority's audit powers, that certainty becomes less relevant, while the accessories accumulating on any eventual adjustment keep growing. A file resolved in 2027 protects less and costs more than the same file resolved today.
Resolution sets a technical reference point for the years it no longer covers. The margin agreed with the authority and the functional characterisation documented in the QMA file do not cease to exist when the agreement term ends. They constitute a precedent built together with the authority itself, useful for supporting the company's position from 2025 onward, when only the Safe Harbor remains available. Abandoning the file also forfeits that precedent.
There is an opportunity cost that is rarely accounted for. Each year under the Safe Harbor in an asset-intensive company represents an income tax difference that does not come back. In the worked example in section 4, that difference amounts to USD 333,900 per year. Choosing not to push the file forward is not cash-neutral: it carries an identifiable annual price, and that price is paid even when no one takes the decision explicitly.
How we approach this at Quantum Pricing. We work with companies that have pending APA requests to drive and secure their resolution before the SAT: we review the consistency of the file and the QMA workbook, align it with current mechanics, manage the technical dialogue with the authority and design the transition to the optimal structure for the years not covered. If your group has an unresolved APA, its status is worth reviewing without delay.
On timing. Resolution of pending requests depends on the timelines and criteria of the competent authorities in both jurisdictions. No amount of diligence guarantees a particular timeline or outcome. The quality of the file and the timeliness of responses can be managed.
3. The structural routes and their current availability
For companies without a pending request, or for years not covered by one, alternatives to the Safe Harbor still exist. It is worth distinguishing, however, between technical soundness and practical availability.
A. The BAPA: sound in substance, constrained on timing
An agreement negotiated jointly between the taxpayer, the SAT and the foreign competent authority under a double taxation treaty.
Legal basis: Article 34-A of the CFF, read together with the Mutual Agreement Procedure article of the applicable treaty (Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention; for example, the Mexico-United States Convention). That article opens the negotiation channel between competent authorities through which a bilateral agreement is processed.
Its technical logic (QMA): the Qualified Maquiladora Approach is the methodology Mexico and the United States have used for over a decade for maquiladora operations. It estimates the income attributable to the Mexican entity by distinguishing labour-intensive from capital-intensive profiles, and, once discussed with the US authority, its results are recognised as arm's length under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Advantage: it eliminates double taxation and allows a margin consistent with the entity's real profile, avoiding the asset effect.
The consideration that weighs most today: timing. A BAPA requires the acceptance and the work of two tax administrations, and both operate with heavy inventories. Statistics published by the IRS APMA program for 2025 illustrate the point: 110 agreements executed against 142 in 2024 and 156 in 2023, a pending request inventory that grew to 622, and a median completion time of 46.4 months for new bilateral APAs, with contributing factors that include staff reductions within the program itself.
In other words: the BAPA remains the structurally correct solution for a capital-intensive maquiladora, but planning it as a short-term fix is unrealistic. Anyone considering it should size it in years rather than months, and understand that whether it starts at all depends on the willingness of both authorities.
In practice, the first step does not change: quantify the gap between the Safe Harbor and the result under the QMA. If it is material, that figure is useful both for advancing a pending file and for deciding, when conditions allow, whether a BAPA justifies the investment.
B. Migration to the general regime
Giving up the maquila regime and taxing as a contract manufacturer can reduce income tax, but it requires redesigning the legal architecture: leaving Article 181 revives PE risk, so the subsidiary must formally acquire or lease the assets and eliminate agency features in relation to the parent. USMCA rules of origin must also be modelled.
Before any of that, one question decides the case: how much inventory the operation moves. The income tax saving on this route is calculated on profit, while the VAT cost is calculated on the value of imported goods, which in manufacturing is usually a multiple of profit. An operation that today imports its inputs temporarily under a VAT and IEPS certification, and moves to a structure in which it purchases that inventory outright, must disburse 16% on every import and wait to recover it through refund or credit.
The tax is recovered, but the cash is tied up in the meantime. In an inventory-intensive maquiladora with high turnover and refund cycles measured in months, the working capital immobilised by that deferral can exceed, on its own, the annual income tax saving that motivated the change. This is why migration to the general regime must be assessed first against the company's balance sheet and only then against its effective rate: an inventory-intensive operation rarely finds an improvement here, however favourable the income tax comparison may look.
4. Worked example: "MexiTech Components, S. de R.L. de C.V."
A technology-intensive IMMEX maquiladora with high-value inventory and machinery belonging to the parent company.
| Item (USD) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Local operating costs and expenses | $10,000,000 |
| Fixed assets owned by the subsidiary | $2,000,000 |
| Foreign-owned assets held under bailment | $15,000,000 |
| Consigned inventory (owned by the parent) | $10,000,000 |
| Total assets in the operation | $27,000,000 |
Scenario A, Safe Harbor. Tax applies to the greater of 6.9% on assets (6.9% × $27M = $1,863,000) and 6.5% on costs (6.5% × $10M = $650,000). Base: $1,863,000; income tax at 30% (Article 9 LISR) = $558,900. Implied margin on costs: 18.63%.
Scenario B, resolved APA or BAPA. With an illustrative mark-up of 7.5% on costs: profit $750,000; income tax = $225,000. Saving against the Safe Harbor: $333,900 per year. PE exempt under the treaty.
Scenario C, general regime. With an illustrative margin of 8.0% on costs: profit $800,000; income tax = $240,000. But the company assumes inventory risk and, if it loses its certification, must fund VAT at customs.
| Metric | A: Safe Harbor | B: APA / BAPA | C: General regime |
|---|---|---|---|
| Taxable base | $1,863,000 | $750,000 | $800,000 |
| Income tax (30%) | $558,900 | $225,000 | $240,000 |
| PE protection | Yes (automatic) | Yes (by treaty) | No (restructuring required) |
| Implementation | Minimal | High. Pending file: months. New BAPA: years | High (legal redesign) |
Note. The 7.5% and 8.0% margins are assumptions of the example. In practice they are determined through the QMA or bilateral analysis (B), or through a comparables study under Articles 179 and 180 LISR (C).
The VAT factor. Temporary imports under IMMEX trigger VAT at 16%, unless the company holds the VAT and IEPS certification, which allows a 100% credit and defers payment. Losing that certification when restructuring can turn an income tax saving into severe cash flow pressure.
5. The 2026 context: Agreement 68/2026 and nearshoring
In early May 2026, the Ministry of Finance published Agreement 68/2026 in the Federal Official Gazette. Its nature deserves precision: these are non-binding guiding criteria; it is not a reform and it does not limit the SAT's powers, but it sets institutional expectations that can be invoked during an audit. Among the points relevant to manufacturing: observance of treaties, which favours access to Mutual Agreement Procedures; a single audit per fiscal year with selective sampling; non-retroactivity; cancellation of digital seal certificates as a measure of last resort; faster VAT refunds; and tax proportionality (Article 31, section IV of the Constitution).
That gesture of moderation coexists with an enforcement environment that has hardened in the opposite direction. The SAT's 2026 Master Plan published twelve audit trigger criteria in advance, and transfer pricing reviews of large taxpayers are now among the authority's most productive lines of work. For a maquiladora, both signals point the same way: the quality of the file matters more than ever.
All of this unfolds while Mexico seeks to position itself as an investment destination for advanced manufacturing and semiconductors under nearshoring and the USMCA. In that setting, fiscal predictability is a competitive asset, but Agreement 68/2026 is a policy signal, not firm legal protection.
6. Conclusions
If you have a filed and unresolved APA, that is your priority for 2026. It is the only route to legal certainty that is actionable in the short term, and part of the backlog, namely the quality of the file and the timeliness of responses, does depend on you.
The Safe Harbor works as a compliance floor, and for some profiles it is expensive. In asset-intensive groups, the 6.9% test on a base that includes machinery under bailment and consigned inventory erodes the margin of a routine manufacturer.
The BAPA remains the structural solution, sized in years. It requires the acceptance and the work of two tax administrations, both with heavy inventories. The first step is still to quantify the Safe Harbor versus QMA gap.
Restructuring into the general regime requires verifying two conditions before any others: that the operation can accommodate the legal redesign that leaving Article 181 imposes, and that it is not inventory-intensive, because VAT on outright imports can absorb the income tax saving through the cash flow channel.
In short: the question to bring to the committee is which legal and operational architecture allows the company to pay what corresponds to its real functional profile, without PE risk or double taxation. For a significant part of the maquiladora sector, the answer begins with a filing that has already been submitted and merely needs to be closed, and every year that passes without closing it carries a cost that can be calculated. At Quantum Pricing we support that closing.
Legal basis and sources
LISR: Articles 9 (30% rate), 179-180 (transfer pricing methodology), 181 (maquila operations and PE exemption) and 182 (Safe Harbor).
CFF: Article 34-A (private rulings / APAs) and Articles 17-A and 21 (inflation adjustment and surcharges).
IMMEX Decree and Miscellaneous Tax Resolution: qualifying requirements for a maquila operation (including the 30% machinery test and the 10% cap on other revenue).
2022 reform: Decree amending, adding to and repealing various provisions of the Income Tax Law and other statutes, published in the Federal Official Gazette on 12 November 2021, effective 1 January 2022. https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lisr/LISR_ref07_12nov21.pdf
2026 Federal Revenue Law (Federal Official Gazette, 7 November 2025), Article 11, in conjunction with Article 21 of the CFF: late-payment surcharge rate of 2.07% per month.
OECD: Model Tax Convention (Article 25, Mutual Agreement Procedure); Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2022 edition, in force 2025-2026); BEPS Action 14 MAP Statistics.
Mexico-United States framework: maquiladora agreements (1999 and 2016) and QMA renewals of 2020 and 2024; Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code.
IRS APMA program:Announcement and Report Concerning Advance Pricing Agreements, March 2026 (fiscal year 2025 statistics).
Ministry of Finance: Agreement 68/2026 (Federal Official Gazette, May 2026), guiding and non-binding in nature.
Translator’s Notes
¹Comodato: a Mexican civil-law gratuitous bailment (loan for use) under which the lender retains title throughout the term. There is no exact U.S. common-law equivalent; the asset’s treatment for U.S. transfer-pricing purposes — particularly regarding who bears economic ownership for Section 482 purposes — may differ from its treatment under Mexican tax law.
²"S. de R.L. de C.V." (sociedad de responsabilidad limitada de capital variable) corresponds to a Mexican variable-capital limited liability company. It is functionally analogous to a U.S. LLC but governed by Mexican corporate law.
Informational document for professional dissemination. Professional information document. It does not constitute tax, legal or accounting advice for a specific case. Resolution of pending requests is subject to the timelines, criteria and willingness of the competent authorities in both jurisdictions. Each case requires its own functional and comparability analysis.
Methodological note. This document is based on the LISR, the CFF, the IMMEX Decree, the OECD Model Tax Convention, and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2022 edition, in force for 2025–2026). The figures in the worked example are illustrative and do not constitute market comparables or advice for a specific case.